GNSO: 3 council members per constituency.

ICANN has published proposed corrections to the bylaws, to be considered by the board on 15 January 2004. These corrections change the number of council members per constituency back from two (as suggested by the reformed bylaws, but never impleme…

ICANN has published proposed corrections to the bylaws, to be considered by the board on 15 January 2004. These corrections change the number of council members per constituency back from two (as suggested by the reformed bylaws, but never implemented) to three (as favored by the majority of the council, and accepted by the board in Carthage) until the 2004 annual meeting.It’s worth noting that the change as drafted seems to need a correction: The terms suggested (2 reps until 2005, 1 rep until 2004, two-year terms from 2005) do not lead to the staggered terms for council members that are mentioned elsewhere in the bylaws — unless there is another board decision that removes the 2004 sunset date on the three representative scheme.

A photo blog.

So I finally couldn’t resist: Keine Photos bitte (“no photos please”) is where I’m posting the occasional picture. The text that comes with the photos will be in German.

So I finally couldn’t resist: Keine Photos bitte (“no photos please”) is where I’m posting the occasional picture. The text that comes with the photos will be in German.

Esther Dyson on The Accountable Net.

Writes Esther Dyson in the New York Times (link credit: Bret Fausett): What I’m proposing is not a rule-free society, but one in which rules come from the bottom up: generally enforced by peers, with governments in the background. … The basic ru…

Media_httplogdoesnote_untba

Writes Esther Dyson in the New York Times (link credit: Bret Fausett): What I’m proposing is not a rule-free society, but one in which rules come from the bottom up: generally enforced by peers, with governments in the background. … The basic rule is transparency: You need to know whom you are dealing with, or be able to take proper measures to protect yourself.Unfortunately, the article essentially sets up anonymity and accountability online as contradictions. They need not be: The kind of accountability Esther describes is not so much about knowing who someone is in real life, but rather about recognizing a party you are dealing with (or knowing that you don’t recognize a party seeking to communicate with you, and taking appropriate action). It’s, often, not so much about linking on-line activity to real lilfe, but more often about linking current on-line activity to past on-line activity — and, by symmetry, linking future on-line activity to current on-line activity.This is so because for many activities online, stakes are actually quite low: To decide who’s messages to read on mailing lists, or blogs, or slashdot — or, in the past, Usenet –, for instance, it may quite well be enough to know that source’s reputation among peers, or to have read earlier messages from that source. If something goes wrong, only littlel damage is done. All one needs to know to make this kind of choice is a regularly-used online pseudonym (most often, that’s the e-mail address these days). If the same person uses a different pseudonym elsewhere, that’s their business.(Where the stakes are higher, reliable links to a person’s online existence are, of course, useful.)Accountability online is not a binary choice between total anonymity on the one hand, and total transparency with links to real life on the other: There is a broad spectrum between these, and often, the level of transparency and accountability that’s needed will lie somewhere in between.As a side note, all the accountability you can get won’t fix viruses and similar security intrusions, unlike what Esther suggests: Just like the ordinary flu, successful online viruses often travel along the links in social networks.

.org: Thick, but fat-reduced.

A reader from PIR writes to note that the whois data element chart is wrong about the thick .org whois service. In August 2003, the .org registry WHOIS appendix was changed to be consistent with the data elements that registrars need to publish: T…

A reader from PIR writes to note that the whois data element chart is wrong about the thick .org whois service. In August 2003, the .org registry WHOIS appendix was changed to be consistent with the data elements that registrars need to publish: The Registry Operator will not be required to post Whois Output Fields that are not required for posting in the Registrar Accreditation Agreement.Updated data element chart here.

.name WHOIS

I’m unimpressed by the privacy offered by .name WHOIS: The “detailed WHOIS” service which, according to the TLD agreement, is supposed to be password protected is the default service for port 43 queries, and is available from the web form without …

I’m unimpressed by the privacy offered by .name WHOIS: The “detailed WHOIS” service which, according to the TLD agreement, is supposed to be password protected is the default service for port 43 queries, and is available from the web form without giving a password.But then again, these guys might have better things to do.Updated WHOIS data element chart including .name here.

Sender Permitted From.

SMTP SPF: Senders Permitted From is a spam-avoiding proposal that looks like it might be adopted widely; it gives senders of e-mail a way to describe through DNS records what their messages look like and where they come from. E-Mails that don’t ma…

SMTP SPF: Senders Permitted From is a spam-avoiding proposal that looks like it might be adopted widely; it gives senders of e-mail a way to describe through DNS records what their messages look like and where they come from. E-Mails that don’t match the description can then be discarded.The proposal is likely to be adopted widely because it creates interesting incentives: If significant e-mail receivers apply SPF checks where available (and don’t require senders to use SPF), and require existing sender domain names, this creates incentives for spammers to abuse non-SPF-enabled domain names. This will be painful for the holders and users of these domains, who in turn have strong incentives to publish SPF records. The same incentives apply for SPF records that are so loose that they are ineffective, or almost ineffective.Later: Steve Bellovin (on IP) has a number of problems with the scheme.

WHOIS data element chart

Here’s a [PDF] chart of data elements found in registrar and registry WHOIS services. The chart (prepared for WHOIS Task Force 2’s purposes) ignores .name (which is special), and TLD-specific data elements like eligibility related elements in the …

Here‘s a [PDF] chart of data elements found in registrar and registry WHOIS services.The chart (prepared for WHOIS Task Force 2’s purposes) ignores .name (which is special), and TLD-specific data elements like eligibility related elements in the sponsored/restricted TLDs, and trademark information in .info and .pro. Also ignored: name server names v. name server IP addresses, opaque database keys, contacts’ “organization” fields.